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题名: Social cycling and conditional responses in the Rock-Paper-Scissors game
作者: Wang, ZJ ;  Xu, B ;  Zhou, HJ
刊名: SCIENTIFIC REPORTS
出版日期: 2014
卷号: 4, 页码:5830
关键词: ITERATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA ;  TIT-FOR-TAT ;  EVOLUTIONARY GAMES ;  STABLE STRATEGIES ;  LOSE-SHIFT ;  WIN-STAY ;  DYNAMICS ;  CYCLES ;  BIODIVERSITY ;  COOPERATION
学科分类: Physics
DOI: 10.1038/srep05830
通讯作者: Zhou, HJ (reprint author), Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Theoret Phys, State Key Lab Theoret Phys, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China.
部门归属: [Wang, Zhijian] Zhejiang Univ, Expt Social Sci Lab, Hangzhou 310058, Zhejiang, Peoples R China ;  [Xu, Bin] Zhejiang Gongshang Univ, Publ Adm Coll, Hangzhou 310018, Zhejiang, Peoples R China ;  [Zhou, Hai-Jun] Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Theoret Phys, State Key Lab Theoret Phys, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China
英文摘要: How humans make decisions in non-cooperative strategic interactions is a big question. For the fundamental Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) model game system, classic Nash equilibrium (NE) theory predicts that players randomize completely their action choices to avoid being exploited, while evolutionary game theory of bounded rationality in general predicts persistent cyclic motions, especially in finite populations. However as empirical studies have been relatively sparse, it is still a controversial issue as to which theoretical framework is more appropriate to describe decision-making of human subjects. Here we observe population-level persistent cyclic motions in a laboratory experiment of the discrete-time iterated RPS game under the traditional random pairwise-matching protocol. This collective behavior contradicts with the NE theory but is quantitatively explained, without any adjustable parameter, by a microscopic model of win-lose-tie conditional response. Theoretical calculations suggest that if all players adopt the same optimized conditional response strategy, their accumulated payoff will be much higher than the reference value of the NE mixed strategy. Our work demonstrates the feasibility of understanding human competition behaviors from the angle of non-equilibrium statistical physics.
资助者: Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities [SSEYI2014Z]; State Key Laboratory for Theoretical Physics [Y3KF261CJ1]; Philosophy and Social Sciences Planning Project of Zhejiang Province [13NDJC095YB]; National Basic Research Program of China [2013CB932804]; Knowledge Innovation Program of Chinese Academy of Sciences [KJCX2-EW-J02]; National Science Foundation of China [11121403, 11225526]
收录类别: SCI
原文出处: 查看原文
语种: 英语
WOS记录号: WOS:000339421300011
Citation statistics: 
内容类型: 期刊论文
URI标识: http://ir.itp.ac.cn/handle/311006/15704
Appears in Collections:理论物理所2014年知识产出 _期刊论文

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Recommended Citation:
Wang, ZJ,Xu, B,Zhou, HJ. Social cycling and conditional responses in the Rock-Paper-Scissors game[J]. SCIENTIFIC REPORTS,2014,4:5830.
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