Zou, Y (reprint author), E China Normal Univ, Dept Phys, Shanghai 200062, Peoples R China.
文章类型:
Article
英文摘要:
Evolutionary game theory is crucial to capturing the characteristic interaction patterns among selfish individuals. In a population of coordination games of two strategies, one of the central problems is to determine the fixation probability that the system reaches a state of networkwide of only one strategy, and the corresponding expectation times. The deterministic replicator equations predict the critical value of initial density of one strategy, which separates the two absorbing states of the system. However, numerical estimations of this separatrix show large deviations from the theory in finite populations. Here we provide a stochastic treatment of this dynamic process on complex networks of finite sizes as Markov processes, showing the evolutionary time explicitly. We describe analytically the effects of network structures on the intermediate fixations as observed in numerical simulations. Our theoretical predictions are validated by various simulations on both random and scale free networks. Therefore, our stochastic framework can be helpful in dealing with other networked game dynamics.
National Natural Science of China [11305062, 11135001, 81471651]
; Specialized Research Fund (SRF) for the Doctoral Program [20130076120003]
; SRF for ROCS, SEM
; Innovation Program of Shanghai Municipal Education Commission [12ZZ043]
; Open Project Program of State Key Laboratory of Theoretical Physics, Institute of Theoretical Physics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, China [Y4KF151CJ1]
Zhang, LY,Zou, Y,Guan, SG,et al. Analytical description for the critical fixations of evolutionary coordination games on finite complex structured populations[J]. PHYSICAL REVIEW E,2015,91(4):42807.
